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I. DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE 
There are a lot of reasons not to want to talk about political theology. For 
starters, its association with the archconservative political theorist Carl Schmitt 
and his dubious association with Hitler1 are enough for many people to condemn 
the subject and take it off the table of intellectual conversation forever. Even 
people who have only a nodding acquaintance with this episode in the annals of 
political thought know enough to dismiss Schmitt as a German political theorist 
who venerated authoritarianism, exalted political violence, derided liberalism, and 
explicitly lent the imprimatur of his theory of political theology to Hitler’s Nazi 
ideology and rise to dictatorial power. The malodor of fascism attached to political 
theology ever since has never been dispelled, and it accounts for much of the 
disinclination to engage with the subject found in many quarters of the academy.  
Notwithstanding the growing prominence of states of emergency around the 
world that have led many intellectuals to find the turn to Schmitt practically 
irresistible, there are many other academics, including ones who are receptive to 
 
* Nathan and Lilly Shapell Chair in Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law. 
I wish to acknowledge the valuable research assistance provided by Tracy Chan. 
1. On the debate about the nature and extent of Schmitt’s Nazi sympathies, see, e.g., JOSEPH 
W. BENDERSKY, CARL SCHMITT: THEORIST FOR THE REICH (1983); DAVID DYZENHAUS, 
LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR 
85–101 (1997); RAPHAEL GROSS, CARL SCHMITT AND THE JEWS: THE “JEWISH QUESTION,” THE 
HOLOCAUST, AND GERMAN LEGAL THEORY ( Joel Golb trans., 2007); William E. Scheuermann, 
After Legal Indeterminacy: Carl Schmitt and the National Socialist Legal Order, 1933–36, 19 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1743 (1998); William E. Scheuermann, Legal Indeterminacy and the Origins of Nazi Legal Thought: The 
Case of Carl Schmitt, 17 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 571 (1996). 
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other forms of radical critique, who vehemently resist Schmitt’s theory that the 
state of emergency is the true nature of political sovereignty.2 
For others, it is not its association with illiberal politics, but other apparent 
features of political theology that stand in the way of accepting or even engaging 
with it. Even if the precise meaning of the “theology” in political theology is 
obscure—and even though Schmitt’s famous dictum that “all significant concepts 
of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts”3 seems to 
allow for the standard account of secularization, in which ideas and practices with 
religious origins gradually shed their original religious meaning4—many people 
tend to recoil from the sense, however dim, that political theology involves 
somehow staging a return of religion to the political scene (or denying that it ever 
departed). This association with religion and the intellectual project of “re-
enchantment” is undoubtedly responsible for much of the resistance to political 
theology found among people otherwise drawn to radical critique.5 If, as it is 
sensed, political theology is more than a history of ideas and actually puts forward 
claims about the nature of law and political sovereignty of a trans-historical sort 
with applicability to our own contemporary political situation, then the thought 
that it involves a denial of the secular character of government is more than a little 
off-putting to the many people who see no legitimate place for religion in political 
life. The possibility that there might be differences between the theological politics 
of religious conservatives who call for the recognition that “this is a Christian 
nation” (or a Muslim, Jewish, or Hindu nation as the case may be)6 and the 
 
2. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY (Mass. Inst. of Tech. trans., 1985) (1934). 
3. Id. at 36. 
4. Against this standard secularization thesis, a rising tide of scholarship has emerged 
contesting the proposition that the religious underpinnings that traditionally undergirded the social 
and political order have fallen away. See TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: 
CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY (2003); PETER L. BERGER ET AL., THE DESECULARIZATION OF 
THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS (Peter L. Berger ed., 1999); JOSÉ 
CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD (1994); CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR 
AGE (2007). Related literature in the field of European intellectual history, devoted to debunking, or 
complicating, the standard opposition between religion and the Enlightenment, is analyzed in 
Jonathan Sheehan’s excellent review essay, Enlightenment, Religion, and the Enigma of Secularization, 108 
AM. HIST. REV. 1061 (2003). As much of the contemporary literature on political theology 
demonstrates, there is an ambiguity within the proposition that modern concepts are secularized 
theological concepts, which permits Schmitt’s (and other) conceptions of political theology to be read 
to support either the standard secularization thesis or the emergent critique. My position, advanced in 
this Article, might be viewed as an attempt to forge a dialectical synthesis of the two. 
5. See Yishai Blank, The Reenchantment of Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 633, 633–35 (2011). 
6. For examples of the assertion that this is a Christian nation found in contemporary 
American conservative political discourse, see, e.g., DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE 
COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND RELIGION (2d ed. 1997); DAVID BARTON, THE MYTH OF 
SEPARATION: WHAT IS THE CORRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE? (3d ed. 
1992); JERRY FALWELL, LISTEN, AMERICA! (1980); TIM LAHAYE, FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING 
FATHERS (1987). For discussion, see BENJAMIN HART, FAITH & FREEDOM: THE CHRISTIAN ROOTS 
OF AMERICAN LIBERTY (1988); John D. Inazu, Between Liberalism and Theocracy, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
591, 598 (2011). Regarding the many varieties of Islamic states and nation-states rooted in other faith 
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intellectual tradition of political theology of which Schmitt was the chief modern 
exponent is just too fine a point. For people of a certain sort of secularist 
sensibility, any intellectual project that harnesses theology for political ends or 
grounds government on theology is suspect, seeming as it does to offend their 
sense of the inviolability of the principle of separation between church and state. 
This aversion to religion in politics is surely one reason that explains why 
many people are reluctant to get on the political theology bandwagon. The very 
fact that there is such a bandwagon is yet another. Hundreds of articles and books 
on political theology have poured out of the academy over the last decade,7 and 
 
traditions that have been envisaged and, in growing numbers of cases, actually established in 
contemporary times, see RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010). Hirschl rightly notes 
that not all states that define themselves as Jewish, Islamic, etc., are, ipso facto, theocratic, and further 
recognizes that that the question of how to define theocracy and distinguish theocratic from non-
theocratic forms of government is not an easy one. Id. at 2–6. 
7. Writing in 2011 about the current revival of interest in Schmitt in his article, Carl Schmitt and 
the Critique of Lawfare, David Luban observes that “[a] Lexis search reveals five law review references 
to Schmitt between 1980 and 1990; 114 between 1990 and 2000; and 420 since 2000, with almost 
twice as many in the last five years as in the previous five.” David Luban, Carl Schmitt and the Critique of 
Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 457, 468 (2011). A more recent search on JSTOR unearthed over 
600 results for the past ten years. Paul Kahn traces the revival of interest in Schmitt to the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1989. See PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON 
THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 6 (2011) (“Post-1989, Schmitt became a reference point for those 
who sought to develop a broadly antiliberal theory, free of the decades-old dispute between the 
communitarians and the liberals.”). For just a small sampling of contemporary legal periodical 
literature discussing Schmitt’s concept of political theology, in addition to the Scheuermann sources 
cited supra note 1, see Lior Barshack, Constituent Power as Body: Outline of a Constitutional Theology, 56 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 185, 185–86, 222 (2006), criticizing Schmitt’s conception of political theology for its 
commitment to an “immanent” as opposed to a “transcendent” account of sovereignty and 
proposing an “alternative political theology” that “secure[s] the transcendence of sovereignty,” while 
“allow[ing] for diversity of opinion and pluralism” and remaining rooted in “the quest for a 
theological, or semi-theological, understanding of constituent power”;; Paul W. Kahn, The Question of 
Sovereignty, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 259, 263–64 (2004), drawing parallels between the understanding of 
the relationship of law to sovereignty in the modern international order and Schmitt’s conception of 
political sovereignty; Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 235, 
238 (2007), asserting “parallels” between the Bush administration’s “theory of Executive power” and 
the political theory of German constitutional theorist Carl Schmitt; Andrew Norris, Sovereignty, 
Exception, and Norm, 34 J.L. & SOC’Y 31, 31 (2007), critiquing Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty; 
Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 1001, 1003–04 (2004), analyzing the Bush administration’s response to the events of 
9/11 and comparing it to the response of America’s European allies through the lens of Carl 
Schmitt’s writing on the state of exception; D.A. Jeremy Telman, Should We Read Carl Schmitt Today?, 
19 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 127 (2001), reviewing the 1999 publication of the edited volume, 
GREGORIS ANANIADIS ET AL., THE CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1999); 
and Symposium, Carl Schmitt: Legacy and Prospects: An International Conference in New York City, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1469 (2000), collecting responses to Schmitt’s work. For book length treatments 
(again, just a small sample), see, e.g., DYZENHAUS, supra note 1; DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY (2006); OREN GROSS & 
FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (2006); BONNIE HONIG, EMERGENCY POLITICS: PARADOX, LAW, DEMOCRACY (2009); 
EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY (Victor Ramraj ed., 2008); SOVEREIGNTY, 
EMERGENCY, LEGALITY (Austin Sarat ed., 2010).  
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for people who are generally allergic to intellectual fashions,8 that by itself is 
enough reason not to engage with the literature. I know because I was one of 
those people. Throughout the first half of the last decade, as the post-9/11 
rumblings of scholarly interest in Giorgio Agamben grew, I resolutely refrained 
from reading both his work and the works of Schmitt from which his theory of 
“the state of exception” derives.9 When I did finally read Agamben, I was slow to 
perceive the connections with my own interests. Although I work on law and 
religion, I failed to appreciate how the liberal tradition of legal and political 
philosophy on which I work could be illuminated by the theory of the state of the 
exception or by political theology, more generally, except by way of critique and a 
study in contrasts. The only one of my projects where the connection to political 
theology was immediately apparent to me was one that was not, on the face of it, 
about either law and religion or liberalism. Rather, it was an exploration of the 
relationship between property and sovereignty that focused on the practice and 
the concept of “establishing facts on the ground.”10 The practices of converting 
de facto into de jure realities, commonly described as creating facts on the 
ground,11 did seem to fit rather perfectly with Agamben and Schmitt’s key idea 
that sovereignty is constituted through the declaration of “the exception.”12 
Likewise, the political context to which the term “facts on the ground” is most 
commonly applied ( Jewish settlement of the Occupied Territories) readily lent 
itself to the idea that the state of emergency is a permanent condition, the defining 
feature of modern political sovereignty and not its antithesis.13 
This gave me my first glimmer of insight into the possible utility of the 
theoretical framework in which these concepts were being elaborated. 
Nonetheless, that framework still seemed far afield from my broader interests, 
which lay in the area of the dilemmas of liberalism that arise in modern societies 
characterized by religious and cultural pluralism, on the one hand, and religious 
fundamentalism, on the other. Even with my admittedly limited understanding of 
political theology, I could see that it and the fundamentalist theological politics of 
 
8. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Is Legal Theory Good for Anything?, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 193.  
9. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION: HOMO SACER II (Kevin Attell trans., 2005) 
[hereinafter AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION]. Another work of Agamben’s that excited scholarly 
attention in this period was GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE 
LIFE (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1995) [hereinafter AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER I]. Examples of legal 
scholarship reacting to these works include, inter alia, Fleur Johns, Guantánamo Bay and the Annihilation 
of the Exception, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 613 (2005); John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765 (2007); Charles R. Venator Santiago, From the Insular Cases to Camp X-
Ray: Agamben’s State of Exception and United States Territorial Law, 39 STUD. L., POL. & SOC’Y 15 (2006); 
Adam Thurschwell, Specters of Nietzsche: Potential Futures for the Concept of the Political in Agamben and 
Derrida, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1193 (2003). 
10. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Facts on the Ground, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 107 
(Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Penalver eds., 2010). 
11. For a typical example of the usage of the term, see ALLISON B. HODGKINS, ISRAELI 
SETTLEMENT POLICE IN JERUSALEM: FACTS ON THE GROUND (1998). 
12. See AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION, supra note 9; SCHMITT, supra note 2. 
13. See Stolzenberg, supra note 10, at 126–28. 
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interest to me were not the same. What I could not then see was how the 
theoretical framework of political theology might illuminate the concepts of liberal 
secularism and the conundrums involved in its confrontation with religion that I 
was interested in. And so I left the entire subject of political theology to the side. 
I am indulging in this bit of autobiographical confession not because I am 
proud of my previous resistance to learning about political theology, nor because I 
expect anyone to take an interest in my intellectual formation (or malformation). 
Rather, I relate it because I hope to be able to overcome the resistance that I 
expect to find in others by explaining how I accidentally came upon a view of 
political theology that should be more attractive, or at the very least, more 
interesting, to those who share the common aversion to political theology’s 
ostensible illiberalism and antisecularism. For it was only by stumbling upon 
political theology by accident, without intending to and without reading it through 
the lens of Schmitt and Agamben, that I came upon a conception of it that is 
compatible with, or perhaps even generative of secular and liberal conceptions of 
law and politics. Notwithstanding the fact that this version of political theology 
shares the fundamental characteristics of the emergency theory of politics that 
ostensibly divides political theology from liberalism, this is a version that merges 
with the political philosophy of liberalism. 
Following Nancy Rosenblum (who elsewhere posited the existence of 
“another liberalism”),14 we might call this conception “another political theology,” 
or, perhaps even better, “political theology with a difference.” It is political 
theology with a difference in two senses. First, it differs from the standard account 
of political theology inasmuch as it proposes a very different relationship to 
liberalism than one of mutual antagonism. Second, it contains (and indeed is 
rooted in) a philosophical doctrine that not only accepts but valorizes human 
differences. It is, in short, a liberal conception of political theology, one that has at 
its core a principle of accommodation to human differences—to differences in 
historical and cultural circumstances and to differences in individual and group 
practices and beliefs. 
This principle of accommodation is rightly seen as the root of liberalism, 
notwithstanding the fact that it has given rise to illiberal political practices and 
theories of government just as often as it has given rise to liberal ones.15 For 
 
14. See NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM: ROMANTICISM AND THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL THOUGHT (1987). 
15. On the centrality of the principle of accommodation to liberalism, see OBLIGATIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST 
DEMOCRACIES (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000). On the variety of usages to which the principle of 
accommodation could be put, including profoundly illiberal ones, see AMOS FUNKENSTEIN, 
THEOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY 253 (1986): “The systematic exploitation of this new figure of thought varied according to 
polemical or apologetic needs. At times it served to enhance apocalyptic expectations, at times to curb 
them; at times it served to stress the continuity of the old and new dispensation against Marcion and 
the agnostics, at times to stress, against Jews, their difference; it was later instrumental in the 
construction of a political theology, but was also instrumental in refuting any intrinsic link between 
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centuries, indeed millennia, this principle of accommodation was enshrined in 
Christian (and Jewish) theology, where it was formulated as the “doctrine of divine 
accommodation,” which derived in turn from the principle of accommodation 
that was codified in the ancient Greek tradition of classical rhetoric.16 As several 
remarkable books have shown, most notably, Amos Funkenstein’s Theology and the 
Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century and Kathy Eden’s 
Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition: Chapters in the Ancient Legacy and Its Humanist 
Reception, the theological doctrine of divine accommodation had a long career, 
corresponding to the evolution of early modern thought. In Funkenstein’s 
account, it appears as the very origin of modern secularist thought—
notwithstanding its essentially theological character. Although Funkenstein 
focused on the role of the doctrine of accommodation in the development of 
modern scientific and historical thought, he also showed its vital connection to 
early modern social and political theory. It is not, I think, a terribly great leap to 
conclude that the origins of modern political doctrines of liberalism and 
secularism also trace back to this medieval and early modern doctrine (with its 
even older roots in the ancient tradition of classical rhetoric). 
It is far more counterintuitive, and therefore much more controversial, to 
propose that the tradition of political theology associated with Schmitt likewise 
originates in the theological doctrine of accommodation. If both the conclusions 
proposed here hold true (that liberalism derives from the theological principle of 
accommodation and so does political theology), that amounts to saying that the 
intellectual tradition of political theology and the intellectual tradition from which 
modern liberalism derives are the same thing. This, of course, is perfectly consistent 
with the perspective of radical critical thought, which has always seen liberalism 
and secularism as containing their opposites.17 Radical critique, which views 
 
Christianity and the Roman Empire.” Funkenstein’s subsequent discussion of the political theology 
constructed out of the doctrine of accommodation, focusing on Eusebius’s argument for a universal, 
Christian monarchy (which served to justify the Holy Roman Empire and Augustine’s theory of the 
earthly city and the city of God), demonstrates that what I have characterized as a fundamentally 
liberal principle (divine accommodation) could be used to justify illiberal forms of government just as 
well as liberal ones. The point is reinforced by Funkenstein’s later discussion of Vico’s links to 
Hobbes, with Vico’s writings being a paradigmatic application of the doctrine of accommodation to 
human history. Id. at 280–83. 
16. On this tradition’s classical roots, see KATHY EDEN, HERMENEUTICS AND THE 
RHETORICAL TRADITION: CHAPTERS IN THE ANCIENT LEGACY AND ITS HUMANIST RECEPTION 
(1997). On its development in Christian and Jewish medieval and early modern thought, see 
FUNKENSTEIN, supra note 15. For further discussion of the doctrine of divine accommodation, see 
STEPHEN D. BENIN, THE FOOTPRINTS OF GOD: DIVINE ACCOMMODATION IN JEWISH AND 
CHRISTIAN THOUGHT (1993); Stephen D. Benin, The Cunning of God and Divine Accommodation, 45 J. 
HIST. IDEAS 179 (1984); Daniel Stolzenberg, John Spencer and the Perils of Sacred Philology, 214 J. PAST & 
PRESENT 129, 149 (2012), describing the “turn to the doctrine of divine accommodation” in the 
thought of John Spencer. 
17. On the illiberalism of liberalism, see, e.g., HERBERT MARCUSE, REPRESSIVE TOLERANCE 
(1965); Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn’t Exist, 1987 DUKE L.J. 997, 999 (1987). On the dependence of 
the secular state on what is variously described as religion, “the sacred,” or hidden theological 
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liberalism as being riddled with contradictions, has traditionally focused on 
excavating the hidden illiberalism of liberalism. More recently, it has turned to 
revealing liberal secularism’s hidden dependence on religion as well.18 These 
critical perspectives are not difficult to mesh with the proposition that liberalism is 
rooted in an emergency theory of politics, which in turn is rooted in traditional 
theology. 
The proposition that political theology is rooted in the protoliberal 
theological doctrine of accommodation likewise meshes fairly easily with the 
burgeoning literature on the theological roots of liberalism. This a relatively new 
school of historical scholarship, which insists upon the original, if not the 
ongoing, dependence of liberal principles on theological premises found in 
Christian (and Jewish) thought.19 True, the theology that this literature purports to 
unearth is not “political theology” in the specialized sense of that term associated 
with Schmitt.20 Neither radical critique nor the new literature on liberalism’s 
religious foundations portrays the theology that undergirds liberalism as an 
emergency theology. The particular kind of theology hallowed in the conservative 
tradition of political-theological thought is viewed by most historians and critics of 
liberalism to be antithetical to liberalism. Nonetheless, the positions taken 
respectively by radical critics of liberal secularist thought and the new historians of 
liberalism’s religious roots are fundamentally compatible with the first proposition 
advanced here, namely, that liberalism is grounded in the theological doctrine of 
accommodation. 
If, as this Article contends, this doctrine is rightly seen as an emergency (i.e., 
a political) theology, then it follows that scholars are mistaken in their assumption 
that liberalism and political theology are mutually antagonistic. This assertion flies 
 
foundations, see, e.g., ASAD, supra note 4; EVE DARIAN-SMITH, RACE, RELIGION, RIGHTS: 
LANDMARKS IN THE HISTORY OF MODERN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (2010). 
18. See ASAD, supra note 4; DARIAN-SMITH, supra note 17.  
19. See JOHN DUNNE, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE: AN HISTORICAL 
ACCOUNT OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE ‘TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT’ (1969); JAMES R. 
MARTEL, SUBVERTING THE LEVIATHAN: READING THOMAS HOBBES AS A RADICAL DEMOCRAT 
198–99 (2007); JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF 
JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002). For support for the specific idea that the commitment 
to secular government and law derives from theological doctrines, see Peter Fitzpatrick, Legal Theology: 
Law, Modernity and the Sacred, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 321, 326 (2008): “What is forgotten . . . is the 
divine, indeed imperial, origin of secular political authority in the Occident.”; John Witte, Jr., That 
Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1869 (2003), reviewing DANIEL L. DREISBACH, 
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002); 
PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002), and discussing biblical and later 
theological foundations of the principle of separation between church and state; see also several 
articles by Stephen D. Smith, infra note 32. 
20. There is no unified consensus view about the defining features of political theology that 
distinguish it from other political philosophies that are rooted in religious or theological principles, 
but I take some version of an emergency theory of politics to be an essential ingredient, and 
emergency theories are conspicuously lacking from most of the current accounts of the religious roots 
of liberalism. See infra p. 414 for an elaboration of my account of the defining features of political 
theology. 
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in the face of the prevailing view. Because of the deep-seated belief that political 
theology and liberalism are diametrically opposed philosophies, it is only to be 
expected that readers with expertise in the subject of political theology will 
strongly disagree with the version of political theology proposed in these pages. 
This is another form of resistance I am hoping to dispel with my autobiographical 
preface. Unlike the form of resistance discussed earlier (resistance to the very 
discussion of political theology), I expect to find this second form of resistance 
among people who, far from harboring an aversion to political theology, are, on 
the contrary, well acquainted with the subject. Accustomed as they are to viewing 
liberalism and political theology as philosophical opposites, they are unlikely to 
accept or even recognize the fusion of political theology and liberalism proposed 
here. I hope explaining the circuitous route that led to my discovery of a 
“different” political theology will soften this resistance as well.  
Had I gone looking for this counterintuitive version of political theology, I 
never would have found it. Had I searched for it in the contemporary literature 
inspired by Agamben and Schmitt, I would not have come to the understanding I 
now have that political theology is a fundamentally secularist project, constituting 
the very font of modern secular and liberal thought.21 It was only because I was 
looking for something else (to wit, the original meaning of secularism) that I came 
upon this theological tradition of political thought, a tradition I only gradually 
came to recognize as containing all the essential ingredients of political theology. 
These ingredients are, as I understand them, (1) an emergency theory of 
political sovereignty and the state, (2) an understanding of the vital role of the 
exception in any human legal system and the permanence of the state of 
emergency, and (3) a method of reasoning that derives these and other political 
and legal theoretical propositions from theological doctrines and religious 
beliefs.22 Had I not been looking for something altogether different, something 
which I did not expect to contain these basic building blocks of political-
theological thought, I never would have come to political theology at all, let alone 
arrived at a conception of it as containing this unlikely combination of liberal and 
illiberal, religious and secularist ideas. I did not expect to find a single one of these 
elements when I embarked on a research project into the origins of the concept of 
 
21. I would have found support for the conception of political theology advanced in this 
Article in MENACHEM LORBERAUM, POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW: SECULARIZING THE 
POLITICAL IN MEDIEVAL JEWISH THOUGHT (2001), and Suzanne Last Stone, Religion and State: 
Models of Separation from Within Jewish Law, 6 INT’L. J. CONST’L LAW 631 (2008), had I had the sense to 
read those works at the time when I first began to make the connection between political theology 
and secularist political thought. But since I did not know I was looking for it, it was not until later that 
I read these two studies, both of which provide confirmation of the theological roots of secularist 
legal philosophy by tracing its emergence in medieval Jewish thought. 
22. The first two elements outlined above are what make a political theory an emergency 
theory of politics, or what is properly termed a political theology rather than another kind of 
theologically inspired theory about politics and law. The third element is what makes a political theory 
a theology or a theologically grounded theory of politics rather than a “secular” one, in the modern 
sense of that term. 
          
2014] POLITICAL THEOLOGY WITH A DIFFERENCE 415 
secularism. Yet what I found, when I followed the research trail where it led, was a 
complex body of thought characterized by the presence of all three. 
Not unlike Alice, who followed the white rabbit down the rabbit hole, I 
chased the original idea of secularism only to find myself not in a wonderland but 
definitely in a kind of looking-glass world, where religion itself subscribes to 
secularism and liberalism is incubated in this secularist theology. Other concepts 
appear in this universe to be equally topsy-turvy from a contemporary standpoint. 
The conception of political theology that appears in this conceptual universe 
departs from the prevailing view that political theology and liberalism are 
diametrically opposed. It likewise departs from the prevailing view that political 
theology rejects the implicit secularism of modern political thought. It is a 
conception of politics and law which is simultaneously grounded in the principles 
of accommodation and emergency, and based on a theology that recognizes the 
necessity of separating law from religion and establishing a secular state. 
This Article is just a preliminary report on what I found in this looking-glass 
world. It is not a complete account of that world. To do that would require 
reconceptualizing all of liberal thought as political-theological thought while, 
simultaneously, reconstructing all of political theology as a gloss on the doctrine of 
divine accommodation. Here I can only try to make the case that undertaking such 
a simultaneous reconstruction of liberalism and political theology would be a 
worthwhile project. I do so by attempting to demonstrate that liberalism is at 
bottom an emergency theory of politics that derives from the theological doctrine 
of divine accommodation. 
All I really am proposing is that we connect the dots that have already been 
produced by scattered bodies of literature that have yet to be synthesized and 
formed into a coherent narrative. The narrative proposed here synthesizes the 
following propositions: (1) the doctrine of divine accommodation led to the 
elaboration of a “secular theology,” (as Funkenstein and others have shown);23 (2) 
this secularist theology spawned the development of liberal, or more precisely, 
protoliberal, political and legal theories (on this point, the historical scholarship is 
more suggestive than conclusive);24 (3) these theologically grounded political 
 
23. See FUNKENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 3 (explaining how the “secular theology” that 
“emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” was secular, not only “in that it was conceived by 
laymen for laymen,” but “also in the sense that it was oriented toward the world, ad seculum,” and 
further explaining that it was theology in that it “dealt with most classical theological issues—God, the 
Trinity, spirits, demons, salvation, the Eucharist”—and because it was “not confined to the few truths 
that the ‘natural light’ of reason can establish unaided by revelation”). The rest of this magisterial 
study develops the secularist character of this theological tradition rooted in the doctrine of divine 
accommodation in more detail. Cf. Stolzenberg, supra note 16, at 162 (tracing “a key argument in the 
Enlightenment attack on revealed religion to the apologetic scholarship of an Anglican clergyman,” 
who invoked the theological doctrine of divine accommodation). 
24. See FUNKENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 265 (explaining how the doctrine of divine 
accommodation was used to justify the diversity of religious movements); id. at 271 (describing the 
“serious attempt to define the scope of [human] autonomy, of ‘the dignity of man’” that evolved out 
of the theological tradition of accommodation); id. at 279–89 (analyzing Vico’s links to Hobbes and 
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theories contain all the essential ingredients of political theology (i.e., an 
emergency theory of politics and a theological approach to the subject of political 
and legal obligation)—even as they simultaneously bear the defining characteristics 
of a liberal theory of the state and law. If one accepts these three propositions (the 
first of which is a well-established historical claim, the second of which awaits 
further development, the latter of which might be the sole innovative leap of this 
Article), then there is a strong basis for adopting the revisionist views of political 
theology and liberalism proposed here. 
Nonetheless, I should emphasize the tentativeness of the historical and 
theoretical claims I am making. I cannot claim with any certainty that the 
theological tradition that grows out of the doctrine of divine accommodation is the 
birthplace (or even a birthplace) of liberalism or secularist visions of law, as a 
point of fact. Nor can I simply assert that this theological tradition is properly 
classified as a political theology without acknowledging that this is a matter of 
interpretation. Since there is no settled consensus about what the defining 
characteristics of a political theology are, it is hard to say with certitude whether 
any intellectual tradition possesses these characteristics.25 In recognition of the 
slipperiness of the term, all I can do is be clear about the definition of political 
theology to which this Article subscribes,26 while recognizing that there are other 
ways of using and defining the term. 
There are also multiple ways of characterizing the relationship between the 
revisionist version of political theology I offer and the standard version of political 
theology associated with Schmitt and Agamben. One possibility is that these are 
two distinct traditions of theologically grounded political thought—each bearing 
the essential hallmarks of political theology, each representing an alternative way 
of interpreting God’s divine plan and its implications for human government 
within that shared political-theological framework, each existing on a separate, 
parallel track. A second possibility is that these two different conceptions of 
political theology stand in the kind of relationship to one another that Leo Strauss 
famously described as the distinction between exoteric and esoteric traditions.27 
 
Spinoza and the emergence of a sense of human autonomy out of the principle of divine 
accommodation).  
25. For example, the highly influential conception put forth by Ernst Kantorowicz does not 
equate political theology with an emergency theory of politics, and represents a much broader use of 
the term, albeit one associated with the specific medieval tradition which fused theology with the 
absolutist state and gave rise to the notion of the divine right of kings. See ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, 
THE KINGS’ TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1997). On the 
relationship between Kantorowicz’s and Schmitt’s definitions of political theology, see ALAIN 
BOUREAU, KANTOROWICZ: STORIES OF A HISTORIAN 104–06 (Stephen G. Nichols & Gabrielle 
Spiegel trans., 2001). 
26. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
27. LEO STRAUSS, PERSECUTION AND THE ART OF WRITING 142–201 (1952). For an 
argument against characterizing accommodationist theology as an esoteric philosophy in the 
Straussian mold, at least in one particular context (that of its employment by the seventeenth century 
biblical John Spencer in defense of the Church of England), see Stolzenberg, supra note 16, at 144–46. 
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On this view, the more familiar and unequivocally antiliberal version of political 
theology would be the exoteric tradition, while the less familiar, paradoxically 
liberal version of political theology offered here represents the less accessible, 
more intellectual, esoteric “heterodox truth”28 of political theology that the 
exoteric version papers over. A third possibility is that these are not different 
strands of thought at all. Rather, they might represent the same body of thought 
viewed from different angles, each of which brings a different aspect of political 
theology to light (while hiding other aspects of political theology from full view). 
If this is correct, then there is no distinction between the two versions of political 
theology; they are, rather, paradoxically one and the same. 
A full treatment of political theology’s relationship to liberalism would 
answer the question of how the revisionist view of political theology proposed 
here relates to the more familiar view. The aims of this Article are more limited. 
All I try to do here is show that liberalism and political theology share a common 
root in the doctrine of divine accommodation and thereby make a prima facie case 
for their possible fusion. 
This work is a part of an ongoing project of reconstructing the theological 
roots of our modern traditions of liberal, secular legal thought. Other scholars 
have taken the view that all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state 
are secularized theological concepts,29 and still others have contested the 
dominant “secularization thesis,” according to which secularism has steadily 
supplanted traditional religious faith, leaving religion to wither away.30 My work 
subscribes to both of these two positions, but rather than viewing political 
theology as inherently illiberal, as most notable proponents of the concept do, I 
am interested in the arguments for liberalism—and for secularism—that are 
inherent in the theological tradition from which (I think) our legal tradition 
derives. I have referred to this theological tradition elsewhere as “theological 
secularism” or “secularist theology” as it is a tradition of thought that derives the 
intellectual case for the necessity of secular law from theological premises.31 There 
are many components to this intellectual tradition, including (as the 
ultraconservative proponents of political theology maintain) an emergency theory 
of political sovereignty. What I am interested in exploring here is the possibility 
that the theological theory of this state of emergency has always been coupled 
with a principle of accommodation, which derives from the theological doctrine of 
 
28. STRAUSS, supra note 27, at 24. 
29. See, e.g., AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER I, supra note 9, at 91–103; AGAMBEN, STATE OF 
EXCEPTION, supra note 9, at 57; KAHN, supra note 7, at 3–4; Blank, supra note 5, at 633–34; Kahn, 
supra note 7, at 260–61. 
30. See sources cited supra note 4; DARIAN-SMITH, supra note 17. 
31. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, The Profanity of Law, in LAW AND THE SACRED 29 (Austin 
Sarat et al. eds., 2007); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Theses on Secularism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 
1056 (2010). My notion of secularist theology (or theological secularism) is related and indebted to, 
but not precisely the same as, Funkenstein’s conception of secular theology. See FUNKENSTEIN, supra 
note 15, at 3–12. 
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divine accommodation. The remainder of this Article offers a description of the 
content of that doctrine and a brief overview of its evolving usages. It suggests 
that it is out of this ancient principle that modern notions of liberalism, pluralism, 
and religious and cultural accommodation emerge. Even if one does not accept 
this historical claim, the account below suggests the logical coherence of liberalism 
with the fundamental tenets of a theologically derived emergency theory of 
politics. This raises a conceptual possibility that should give pause to liberal critics 
of political theology and radical critics of liberalism alike. 
II. ACCOMMODATION: A LONG HISTORY  
IN TWO HIGHLIGHT REELS AND THREE ACTS 
It is no doubt a folly even to attempt to summarize the overall arc of the 
historical evolution of the principle of accommodation from its origins in the 
tradition of classical rhetoric through its absorption into Christian (and rabbinic) 
thought, where it becomes reformulated as the principle of divine accommodation, 
paving the way for its subsequent modernization and secularization. But if one 
were to attempt such a folly, and were to try to pack that history into one 
sentence, one might say the following: 
The principle of accommodation begins in antiquity, travels through the 
patristic literature of the early church fathers, blossoms in medieval 
Christian theology (and a parallel track of Jewish thought), comes to full 
fruition with Renaissance Humanism, and undergoes the convulsions of 
the Protestant Reformation, whereupon it undergoes a further process of 
modernization and what one wants to call simply secularization were it 
not for the fact that what this history reveals is precisely that secularism is 
an ancient and theological concept, itself a product of the theologizing 
that the classical principle of accommodation underwent. 
What this extremely condensed synopsis highlights is the alteration in the meaning 
of secularism that occurred over (a long, long) time. As others have observed,32 
the concept of secularism has itself been secularized, shorn of its original religious 
foundations. This makes it a challenge to regain a sense of the original meaning of 
either secularism or accommodation. For the two concepts have always, 
theologically, been intertwined. Only by recovering the original religious meaning 
of accommodation can the concept of the secular be fully understood, and vice 
versa. 
 The virtue of the sort of ridiculously compressed history of the principle of 
accommodation offered here is that it makes these connections perspicuous. By 
 
32. See TAYLOR, supra note 4; see also Stephen D. Smith, How is America “Divided by God”?, 27 
MISS. C. L. REV. 141, 150 (2007); Stephen D. Smith, Recovering (From) Enlightenment?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1263, 1276–77 (2004); Stephen D. Smith, Separation and the Fanatic, 85 VA. L. REV. 213, 223 
(1999); Stephen D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular”: Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. 
L. REV. 955, 958–59 (1989); Stephen D. Smith, The “Secular,” the “Religious,” and the “Moral”: What Are 
We Talking About?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 487, 502–03 (2001). 
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collapsing the time frame and speeding up the longue durée, the condensed version 
of the history of its evolution highlights the serial processes of theologization and 
secularization that the principle underwent. It shows that the concept of 
secularism was historically intertwined with the idea of (divine) accommodation 
and was itself first a theological concept, which was subsequently secularized. 
To emphasize the successive phases of theologizing and secularization, we 
might reformulate the highlight reel version of this intellectual history to say: 
The principle of accommodation begins in antiquity, in the precincts of 
the law, courts, and the rhetorical manuals,33 where it functions as 
principle of textual exegesis; it then travels through Christian patristic 
literature, where it develops into a principle of biblical exegesis; it is 
refined even further at the hand of medieval Christian and Jewish 
thinkers, who press it into various forms of religious (and scientific and 
political) service that go well beyond the domain of textual hermeneutics; 
and, finally, after its long sojourn in the precincts of religion, it is returned 
to its original domain as a principle of secular law, having accumulated 
along the way various substantive principles of equity and 
accommodation. 
This alternative version of the compressed history of the principle of 
accommodation highlights the fact that in its first incarnation, the principle was 
meant to guide lawyers in the proper way to interpret and make arguments about 
the meaning of a legal document without any reference to or concern with the 
gods. Later it came to be viewed as a principle about how God speaks to human 
beings and shapes human law to adjust to different cultures and accommodate 
human limitations and deficiencies. And eventually, after a long sojourn dwelling 
in the “theological imagination”34 of Christians and Jews, the principle ended up 
back in the precincts of secular law, having retained its original rhetorical 
commitments, yet having accumulated considerable religious residue along the 
way. The theoretical consequences of this journey into and out of the precincts of 
religious thought (and out of and back into law) were significant. In order to 
clarify those consequences, let us slow down the highlight reel just a little and take 
a closer look at each of this drama’s main acts. 
Act One: Classical Origins 
The key thing to note about the first chapter in the long history of the 
unfolding of the principle of accommodation is that it originates as a principle of 
classical rhetoric in ancient Greece and Rome where it is twinned with the 
Aristotelian principle of equity. Accommodation and equity functioned in the 
classical tradition as exegetical principles, focused primarily on the proper way to 
 
33. EDEN, supra note 16, at 2. 
34. Funkenstein’s title refers to “the scientific imagination” (a term he coined). His book 
makes clear that the scientific imagination of the period was also, or part of, its theological 
imagination. See FUNKENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 11. 
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interpret legal documents (e.g., statutes, contracts, and wills). Applied to the 
interpretive challenges posed by textual ambiguities (such as words with multiple 
meanings and the gaps that arise between the written word and the intention of 
the author), the principles of equity and accommodation together counseled 
recognizing the differences in circumstances that exist between one moment, one 
situation, and another. 
Just as orators were urged by grammarians to adjust (i.e., accommodate) their 
words to their audiences’ capacity to achieve maximal persuasive effect, so too, the 
exegetes were urged by classical rhetoricians to use the understanding that authors 
adjust words to context to guide their interpretations of an author’s text. This 
meant that interpretation was understood to be both a backwards (essentially 
historical) project of reconstructing the author’s intent based on the recognition of 
the context in which the author wrote, and on the other hand, a forward- or 
present-oriented exercise in adjusting the law (or text) to the present 
circumstances so as to produce equitable outcomes. 
The double charge of equity—signifying both consistency with the spirit of 
the author’s intentions and consistency with the spirit of equitable justice—was 
thus, from the outset, completely intertwined with the principle of 
accommodation. This interconnection is made clear in Kathy Eden’s indispensable 
history of Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, which describes Cicero and 
Quintilian, whose rhetorical manuals provided “the most comprehensive and 
detailed treatments of interpretation” in classical antiquity, as “[e]xpert[s] in the art 
of accommodation, as the ars rhetorica was frequently called.”35 Eden singles them 
out as philosophers who “recognized the accommodative nature of all 
interpretation founded upon this same art,”36 explaining that, in the classical 
tradition, it is “[e]quity’s accommodative power—that is, its responsiveness to 
particular circumstances” that “renders it a formidable tool of rhetorical argument, 
insofar as rhetoric itself is first and foremost the art of accommodation.”37 In this 
way, equity was linked to accommodation. Together, they served to link the 
backward/historical focus on the reconstruction of the author’s real intentions 
(which, it was recognized, might deviate from the meaning of his words) to the 
forward-looking focus on producing just outcomes. 
Underlying this “art” was the recognition of “the infinite variety and 
variability of human circumstance.”38 As described by Eden, equity, in its 
outcome-focused role, “offers a necessary correction to the law’s generality by 
taking [this human variety and variability into] account”—in short, “surpass[ing] 
the law through its power to accommodate the individual case.”39 Accommodation 
was thus, from the very beginning, associated with the recognition of the variety 
 
35. EDEN, supra note 16, at 2. 
36. Id. (emphasis added). 
37. Id. at 14. 
38. Id. at 13. 
39. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
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of human circumstances and the refusal to impose on that variety a rigidly 
uniform law. 
Act Two: Theological Accommodation 
The recognition of differences in historical circumstances played an equally 
important role in the next important station in the principle of accommodation’s 
career where this principle of classical hermeneutics was integrated into Christian 
and Jewish thought. In the hands of Christian and Jewish theologians, the 
principles of accommodation and equity served, in the first instances, as 
hermeneutical tools for interpreting scripture, and, more particularly, for 
addressing a variety of challenges and “embarrassments”40 posed by the words of 
the biblical text. These embarrassments included the abundant 
anthropomorphisms used to describe God, which were viewed as theologically 
incorrect; the presence of “abominations,” such as animal sacrifice, seemingly 
commanded by God; anachronisms; and, increasingly (but this was a problem 
from the earliest of times), the apparent inconsistencies between the biblical 
account of creation and the understanding of the physical world produced 
through scientific discoveries and empirical observations. 
The classical tradition of rhetoric, in particular the principle of 
accommodation, was an effective tool for explaining away these various 
embarrassments and for reconciling the seeming inconsistencies within the text. It 
likewise served well as a tool for reconciling seeming inconsistencies between the 
text of the Bible and the findings of the then modern science. More broadly, it 
served to reconcile revelation and reason. As Amos Funkenstein explained in his 
magisterial treatment of the subject, 
Medieval Jewish and Christian exegesis shared the hermeneutical 
principle of accommodation: the assumption that the Scriptures are 
adjusted to the capacity of mankind to receive and perceive them. Out of 
this exegetical topos . . . grew various explanations of the less palatable and 
less understandable biblical precepts and institutions as the adjustment of 
God’s providence to the primitive religious mentality of the nascent 
Israel.41 
This reasoning served first to explain away such theological embarrassments 
as the “prima facie anthropomorphism in the Bible.”42 (“The reason they are 
employed,” per Maimonides, “is to accommodate the lesser capacity for 
abstraction of the masses. The law was given to all in a language to be understood 
by all.”)43 “Gradually,” Funkenstein goes on to explain, 
 
40. FUNKENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 214 (describing the mindset of early biblical scholars for 
whom “the very original presence of prima facie anthropomorphism in the Bible was embarrassing 
and called for a justification” that the doctrine of accommodation supplied). 
41. Id. at 213.  
42. Id. at 214. 
43. Id. 
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[A]s the heuristic horizon of the principle broadened, it came to explain 
more than anthropomorphisms. Evidently the cosmology of the Bible 
differed from the last word of scientists—in the Middle Ages no less than 
today. But Scripture cannot be mistaken; rather, it speaks in the language 
of everyday man.44 
As this passage makes clear, a central concern for which the classical principle of 
accommodation was deployed was how to reconcile scientific discoveries with the 
Bible. 
 The absorption into Christian (and Jewish) theological thinking of the 
principle of accommodation (and the broader tradition of classical hermeneutics 
and rhetoric of which it forms a core part) had a number of important, 
transformative effects. By Funkenstein’s account, virtually all of modern scientific 
thought, including the social sciences as well as the physical sciences, can be traced 
to this fruitful synthesis of classical and religious thought.45 
It is equally important to stress, however, what was preserved throughout 
successive waves of transformation; the principle of accommodation begins and 
remains embedded in the tradition of classical rhetoric. Its subsequent absorption 
into Christian and rabbinic thought does not deprive it of its original rhetorical 
character. Even when it is pressed into service to justify and explicate theological 
projects, including the project of political theology, it retains its commitment to 
the principles of the rhetorical tradition.46 
What the theologization of the principle of accommodation did was not to 
erase its rhetorical origins and character, but rather to expand the domain to 
 
44. Id. at 214–15. 
45. Funkenstein remarks that 
[o]ut of these explanations, or side by side with them, grew grand historical speculations, 
which saw in the whole of history an articulation of the adjustment of divine 
manifestations to the process of intellectual, moral, and even political advancement of 
mankind. It is astonishing that so little has been written about a principle that was so 
fundamental to the medieval reflections on God and mankind, nature and history. 
Id. at 213. His own work takes a giant step in correcting this oversight, painstakingly tracing the 
evolution of that principle from a legal exegetical principle to a principle of biblical exegesis and then, 
in an ever-accelerating trajectory, to the birth of modern scientific theories. 
46. For this reason, I concur wholeheartedly with Brook Thomas’s position that the state of 
emergency is best understood through the lens of the tradition of classical rhetoric, but I disagree that 
this means we should reject the construction of the state of emergency as a product of political 
theology. See Brook Thomas, Reconstructing the Limits of Schmitt’s Theory of Sovereignty: A Case for Law as 
Rhetoric, Not as Political Theology, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 239 (2014). If my proposal is correct, then that 
is a false choice. The tradition of political theology out of which our modern-day concepts of 
sovereignty and law are born was derived from the principle of accommodation, which carried with it 
all of the tropes and theoretical commitments of the tradition of classical rhetoric in which it was 
born. I do share Brook Thomas’s belief about the centrality of legal fictions and metaphors to the 
theory (and practice) of politics that arises out of these rhetorical underpinnings. Without focusing 
specifically on political fictions, or tying the rhetorical understanding of legal fictions to the political 
theology of the emergency state, I have written about this in Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Anti-Anxiety 
Law: Winnicott and the Legal Fiction of Paternity, 64 AM. IMAGO 339 (2007); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, 
Bentham’s Theory of Legal Fictions—A “Curious Double Language,” 11 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 
223 (1999).  
          
2014] POLITICAL THEOLOGY WITH A DIFFERENCE 423 
which it was applied. As we have seen, the original principle of accommodation 
was strictly a principle of hermeneutics, an exegetical principle concerned chiefly 
with documentary construction, in particular, the construction (interpretation) of 
legal documents, such as statutes, contracts, and wills. Together with the principle 
of equity, it provided readers of legal texts with tools for resolving ambiguities and 
preventing laws from having unjust results. Transferring those exegetical tools to 
the project of interpreting the biblical text precipitated a powerful cascade of 
effects, all of which were initiated by the rhetorical need to develop an account of 
the author’s intentions. Such a project, when applied to God, could never remain 
confined to the realm of debates about proper methods of textual interpretation, 
since an account of God’s intentions (in writing a particular passage of the Bible) 
could never be freed from more general theological (metaphysical, ontological, 
and epistemological) questions—questions about the nature of God; the nature of 
the physical world, including the human world; and the relationship between 
them. What were God’s plans for the (human) world? The rhetorical imperative to 
give an account of God’s intentions qua author of the biblical text demanded an 
account of God’s designs that would be consistent with the exegesis being offered.  
Thus it was that the first application of the classical principle of 
accommodation to the biblical text—“that the Scriptures are adjusted to the 
capacity of mankind to receive and perceive them”—immediately yielded a second 
version of the principle of accommodation: “That God adjusted his acts in history 
to the capacity of men to receive and perceive them . . . .”47 With the latter step, 
the principle of accommodation crossed over the boundaries of the field of textual 
interpretation into the much wider field of theological speculation about all 
aspects of God’s creation. 
The initial transformation achieved as a result of the Christianization of the 
principles of classical rhetoric was thus twofold. It was not merely that the 
practitioners of the art of accommodation (the ars rhetorica) had shifted the 
application of that principle from the secular domain of law to the religious 
domain of God’s text (and God’s law). It was also that, in doing so, they 
converted the principle of accommodation (and its perpetual companion, the 
principle of equity) into substantive and not merely exegetical principles. Already 
in the classical tradition the link had been made between equitable interpretation 
and equitable judgments—equity, that is, as a principle of exegesis and equity as a 
substantive principle of justice. But the move to give an account of God’s plan 
and its implications for human knowledge and conduct greatly expanded the 
substantive purview of these twin principles. That substantive purview ultimately 
grew to include theories about the origins and nature of the physical world, 
theories of history, and theories about the proper form of the state. All of this, 
including theories about the state’s relation to its subjects, its relation to God, to 
 
47. FUNKENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 213, 222. 
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religion, to religious authorities, and to human diversity, was derived from the 
fundamental theological tenet that God “speak[s] the language of man.”48 
Ultimately, as Funkenstein’s work shows, the propulsive force of the 
theologized principle of accommodation led it to escape the bounds of theology 
altogether, giving rise to the versions of secular scientific, political, and legal 
discourse with which we are familiar today. What is offered here is but a small part 
of that larger story: a brief outline of how the principle of divine accommodation 
gave rise to a theory of law and politics (a political theology), containing both 
principles of cultural and religious accommodation and an emergency rationale for 
the secular state, which together (I suggest) became the foundation of the modern 
liberal theory of the state. 
Act Three: Theological Secularism and the Emergence of Modern Political Thought 
The two main ideas proposed here are (1) that today’s liberal doctrines of 
tolerance and pluralism and separation of church and state, and liberal political 
theories more generally, are direct descendants of medieval and early modern 
interpretations of the political implications of the theory of divine 
accommodation; and (2) that the intellectual route traveled by those medieval and 
early modern ruminations passed through the terrain of what is rightly called 
political theology. My basic contention is that it was through this route that 
accommodationist theorizing arrived at what we recognize as modern liberal 
political theory today. 
There were many important stations in the process whereby the principle of 
accommodation was first theologized (i.e., integrated into Jewish and Christian 
theological thought) and subsequently de-theologized. Regarding the initial stages 
in the process of its theologization, Eden notes that “Erasmian hermeneutics is 
arguably the most influential and certainly the best known humanist rehabilitation 
of this ancient tradition” of rhetoric.49 But, she notes, the “Christianization of 
rhetorical interpretation-theory” occurred much earlier and “is Paul’s doing” in 
the first instance, “not Augustine’s”50 (though Augustine’s thought also marks a 
key moment in the “Christian appropriation of so-called classical culture”).51 
Funkenstein’s work covers some of the same Christian ground, but moves the 
story both outward (by demonstrating parallel developments in Jewish philosophy 
and rabbinic thought) and forward, demonstrating how the early modern scientific 
revolution and the emergence of historical and cultural awareness (producing the 
field of modern history and other social sciences) all take root here, in the fertile 
ground of secular theology. More specifically, they took root in religious reasoning 
about the implications of divine accommodation for understanding the natural 
world and man’s position in it. 
 
48. The precise quote here is: “The Scriptures speak the language of man.” Id. at 213. 
49. EDEN, supra note 16, at 2. 
50. Id. at 56. 
51. Id. at 41. 
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Of utmost importance for our story is the application of this body of 
theological reasoning to the questions of legal and political order. In addition to 
paving the way for modern forms of science and religious unbelief, the 
theologization of the classical principles of accommodation and equity also paved 
the way for the emergence of modern political theory, beginning with the attempt 
to derive principles of human government and law from the principle of divine 
accommodation. The ultimate result of centuries of thinking about the political 
implications of the doctrine of divine accommodation was the emergence of 
modern liberal political theory. 
This is by no means to say that the political theories derived from the 
principle of accommodation were uniformly liberal in character, or that they 
necessarily prescribed liberal policies of tolerance or a liberal model of the state. 
To the contrary, there was no end to the variety and ingenuity of the political 
theories spun out of the principle of divine accommodation. Many of these were 
of a decidedly illiberal character. Notwithstanding this variety, however, all 
accommodationist political theories (that is to say, all political theories derived 
from the theological principle of divine accommodation) were rooted in the 
inherently liberal principle that differences among human beings—religious 
differences, cultural differences, and differences in their historical circumstances—
are to be respected as part of God’s plan. 
At the heart of all of these different interpretations and applications of the 
principle lay the medieval doctrine of divine accommodation, which held “[t]hat 
God adjusted his acts in history to the capacity of men to receive and perceive 
them”52 and, by the same token, “that the Scriptures are adjusted to the capacity 
of mankind to receive and perceive them.”53 As we have seen, this doctrine 
represented the integration of the principle of accommodation inherited from 
classical rhetoric into Christian theology. A parallel incorporation of the principle 
of accommodation occurred in rabbinic thought. Both the Christian and the 
Jewish reinterpretations of the classical principle of rhetoric turned it into a 
theological principle designed to illuminate the meaning of the Bible and God’s 
design. That theologization of the principle of accommodation in turn paved the 
way for its subsequent modernization and secularization. 
Indeed, although it is counterintuitive from a modern standpoint, what 
connects the older religious notion of accommodation to modern notions of 
secularism and liberalism is the essentially secularist outlook of the original 
theological version of the idea. Notwithstanding the multiple and often 
contradictory usages to which the principle was put and the great variety exhibited 
by the political theories derived from the principle of divine accommodation, what 
all those theories have in common is their shared belief in the inherently secular 
character of human government and law. This secularist character of 
 
52. FUNKENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 222. 
53. Id. at 213. 
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accommodationist political theologies is hard for modern readers to grasp because 
of the prevailing view that secularism and religious belief are conceptually 
dichotomous. It takes a heroic leap of the imagination to think our way out of the 
belief that theological views cannot be secularist and, conversely, that secularist 
institutions cannot be based on religious beliefs. That is the leap this Article is 
trying to make. 
According to the view of secularism that is prevalent today, if a theory of 
government or law (or science, history, or anything else) is derived from religious 
beliefs and based on theological propositions, then it is, ipso facto, not secularist. 
All the more so if the theory purports to follow the will of God. In other words, 
theology and secularism are thought to be mutually exclusive. 
The principle of divine accommodation demonstrates the naïveté of this 
view. The theories that medieval (and, later, early modern) Christian (and Jewish) 
thinkers derived from the application of the principle of divine accommodation 
were uniformly secularist in character in the precise sense that they were based on 
the premise of an unavoidable gap between human knowledge and the divine law 
and the consequent necessity for man to establish and follow secular authorities 
and law. 
To modern ears (and even to the premodern sensibility which I am here 
trying to reconstruct), there is obviously a deep irony in the idea that a theological 
perspective could be secularist. The idea that the necessity of secular government 
and law derives from theological principles, or, more concretely, that secular 
government and law are divinely ordained, sounds paradoxical. Yet this is exactly 
what I am claiming: that the political theology constructed on the basis of the 
principle of divine accommodation was secularist in character, positing the 
coexistence of separate religious and political spheres. More than that, this political 
theology called for the recognition of the autonomy of the latter from the former. 
Out of this apprehension of the (relative) autonomy of human history came the 
commitment to the basic idea that the state and its law must be secular—secular in 
the very specific sense that they cannot be based upon or reflective of divine law. 
More strongly put, secular regimes were understood from this theological 
standpoint to necessarily deviate from the divine law. Indeed, secular regimes were 
understood to violate the divine law. Yet, according to the theological line of 
reasoning generated by the principle of divine accommodation,54 such profane 
political regimes are a necessity that is divinely ordained. 
 
54. The following outline of the argument for secular law found in medieval and early modern 
Jewish and Christian theological thought is based on a more expansive analysis of that argument 
structure presented in Stolzenberg, supra note 31. That analysis was based, in turn, on the accounts of 
emergency theories of criminal law derived from canon law found in JOHN LANGBEIN, TORTURE 
AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE ANCIEN RÉGIME (1977); Richard M. 
Fraher, Conviction According to Conscience: The Medieval Jurists’ Debate Concerning Judicial Discretion and the 
Law of Proof, 7 L. & HIST. REV. 23 (1989); Richard M. Fraher, Preventing Crime in the High Middle Ages: 
The Medieval Lawyers’ Search for Deterrence, in POPES, TEACHERS, AND CANON LAW IN THE MIDDLE 
AGES 212 (James Ross Sweeney & Stanley Chodorow eds., 1989); Richard M. Fraher, The Theoretical 
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What could possibly explain—and justify—the creation of political and legal 
institutions that are not merely secular (i.e., independent of divine law), but 
actually profane (i.e., in violation of it)? It is at this point in the line of argument 
derived from the doctrine of accommodation that emergency theory, as it were, 
emerges. It was only the apprehension that we all would be plunged into a state of 
emergency without the institution of effective (albeit imperfect) authorities that 
could, and did, serve to justify the creation of human institutions so profane that 
they would inevitably violate the sacred rights protected by the divine law. The 
Christian (and Jewish) thinkers who elaborated this emergency theory of 
justification did not blink from the recognition that nothing less than “judicial 
murder” (i.e., wrongful convictions leading to capital punishment) results from the 
institution of human (i.e., secular) law. The only thing that could possibly justify 
such a violation of sacred law, according to them, was the need to avoid the even 
worse situation of anarchy that would otherwise exist: the situation in which crime 
goes unpunished, not precisely forever (its punishment is merely postponed until 
the afterlife) but, from the standpoint of human suffering, much too long. 
Christians and Jews alike perceived that to adhere to a standard of justice so strict 
as to allow zero tolerance for judicial error would produce a world in which 
wrongdoers could act with impunity. Such a state of “perpetual” existential threat, 
(perpetual, that is, within the temporal bounds of the mortal world) was a state of 
emergency that surely could not be God’s design. Yet that was exactly what 
adherence to the strict procedural canons of biblical law required. The only way to 
respond to this state of emergency, they reasoned, was to suspend the strict 
procedural canons of divine law (which tolerated no judicial error) and to replace 
that divine law with a species of what theologians candidly described as an 
emergency state, enforcing emergency law.55 
This is how secular law was originally conceptualized: as the imperfect law 
that exists when the perfect (divine) law cannot be applied and therefore must be 
suspended due to the threats to mortal life and security that would result from 
following its too stringent procedural safeguards—in other words, emergency law. 
All secular law, on this (theological) account, is emergency law. All states are 
emergency states. That is just what human legal and political authority is from the 
point of view of the theology of divine accommodation: emergency law, the law 
 
Justification for the New Criminal Law of the High Middle Ages: “Rei Publicae Interest, Ne Criina Remaneant 
Impunita,” 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 592; and accounts of similar arguments for emergency law in 
Jewish law found in GIL GRAFF, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: DINA DE-MALKHUTA DINA 
IN JEWISH LAW, 1750–1848 (1985); J. David Bleich, Jewish Law and the State’s Authority to Punish Crime, 
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 829, 831 (1991); Arnold Enker, Aspects of Interaction Between the Torah Law, the 
King’s Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1137, 1148 (1991); 
Suzanne Last Stone, Sinaitic and Noahide Law: Legal Pluralism in Jewish Law, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1157 
(1991). A more recent work that even more directly accords with the reading of Jewish emergency 
theology offered here is Oren Gross, Violating Divine Law: Emergency Measures in Jewish Law, in EXTRA-
LEGAL POWER AND LEGITIMACY: PERSPECTIVES ON PREROGATIVE 52 (Clement Fatovic & 
Benjamin A. Kleinerman eds., 2013). 
55. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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that reflects and accommodates to the inability of human beings to follow and be 
governed by divine law, the law that replaces divine law, in other words—secular 
law. 
But if all secular law is emergency law, and if secular law is the law for 
human societies that the principle of divine accommodation ordains, that means 
the state of emergency and the state of accommodation are one and the same. 
What looks from one point of view like the state of exception, a state of pure 
power unbounded by law, is, from another point of view, nothing more or less 
than ordinary law—that is to say, secular law, the man-made law that reflects 
God’s accommodation to human beings’ needs and imperfections. Such law 
accommodates to the deficiencies of human beings—which make it impossible for 
them to follow, enforce, or even recognize the content of the divine law—while 
recognizing their need for safety and order. Although such law necessarily bears 
the defects of emergency law (reflecting its human, all too human nature), it is, 
according to this theological line of argument, accepted and sanctioned by God as a 
divine accommodation to human nature. 
This vision of the state of emergency, rooted in the theology of divine 
accommodation, thus constitutes a radical challenge to the emergency theory 
associated with Schmitt. Schmitt (and his many followers) conceive of the state of 
emergency as a state of pure power unbounded by law. But the state of emergency 
envisaged by accommodationist theology is not a state void of law; it is, rather, a 
state in which one legal regime (the law of the sacred) has been suspended and 
replaced by another (the law of the sublunar world, i.e., secular law). At the same 
time, it challenges the naïve version of the rule of law with its understanding that 
the secular state, as an emergency regime, supplants the moral law with a harsher 
legal regime, subordinating human rights to the exercise of political power and 
“balancing” them against the state’s needs as defined by the state. 56  
The full political-theoretical implications of this viewpoint were, of course, 
open to competing interpretations. On the most minimalist interpretation, this 
equation of the state of emergency (characterized by the absence of divine law) 
with the state of accommodation (characterized by the presence of human law) 
implied (contra the Schmittian thesis) the existence of the rule of law. On a more 
maximalist interpretation, the equation of human law with a state of emergency 
would become the basis for implementing (and eventually constitutionalizing) 
liberal policies of tolerance, accommodation, and checks and balances within the 
state (the argument being that, precisely because human government is necessary, 
yet necessarily highly imperfect—indeed, profane—checks on the exercise of 
political power are necessary). 
These were hardly the only ways to interpret the political implications of 
 
56. To put it another way, “the morality of law,” see LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF 
LAW (1964), and what I have called “the profanity of the law” are one and the same. See Stolzenberg, 
supra note 31. 
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divine accommodation. As noted above, there were a great many different political 
theories that were spun out of the basic principles of accommodationist thought, 
many of which were of a decidedly antiliberal character. More to the point, even 
the most liberal interpretations of the political requirements of the principle of 
accommodation had at their core elements of illiberalism that stood in tension 
with their liberal commitments. This, of course, is precisely what radical critics 
have always maintained: that liberalism is paradoxically illiberal; that tolerance is 
“repressive”;57 and that liberal neutrality is “impossible”58 or “imperial.”59 
Reinserted into its original intellectual (theological) framework, these paradoxical 
aspects of liberalism look less like the revelations of radical critique (which takes as 
its mission the unearthing of the supposedly hidden, self-undermining 
characteristics of liberalism) and more like the logical, unhidden implications of 
the theory’s original insight: that liberal accommodation, secular law, and the state 
of emergency are all the same thing. 
To put it another way, the rule of law is the same thing as the state of 
exception (in which the divine law is suspended and replaced by secular law). This 
explains the illiberal features of the liberal state that generations of radical critics 
have relished exposing, as if they were revealing a dirty secret: its origination in 
violence and legal suspension, its essentially imperial character, and its ongoing 
willingness to suspend rights for the sake of protecting them. From the standpoint 
of the framework of theological thought described here, the illiberalism of 
liberalism can be simply redescribed as the manifestation of the state of emergency 
to which the liberal state of accommodation is always attached. Far from 
appearing paradoxical, from the standpoint of accommodationist political 
theology, all this is simply the logical and necessary consequence of the original 
suspension of divine law. The paradoxes of the limits of tolerance and the 
origination of law out of the suspension (or violation) of law all are seen to 
emanate from the originary paradox of political founding—not the founding of 
any particular sovereign state, but rather the establishment of secular law, per se. 
To put it another way, it is simply a point of fact, from the point of view of 
accommodationist theology, that secular law originates when divine law is 
suspended and violated (yet it is itself divinely mandated and ordained). The 
theological story of divine withdrawal and accommodation to the limited 
perspective of human beings, precipitating imperfect, but necessary, and 
autonomous human legal responses to existential threats, affirms Schmitt and 
Agamben’s proposition that the state of emergency is indeed (always) permanent. 
(The emergency is life.) But if this perspective affirms the existence of a 
 
57. Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81, 83 (Beacon 
Press 1965). 
58. Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2255, 2314 (1997). 
59. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 13 (1983). 
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permanent state of emergency, it also throws it into a new light, revealing it to be 
at once a state in which the law (divine law) is suspended and, contra Schmitt, a 
state of law (i.e., human, secular law). The state of emergency is thus shown to be a 
state of accommodation (i.e., a state that accommodates (to) human weaknesses 
and needs). It is at one and the same time a state of exception and a state of 
normalization, of adaptation to human circumstances, of law and order, 
normalcy—in short, the state of normal law.60 
III. A THEOLOGY OF VARIETY:  
VARIETIES OF ACCOMMODATIONIST THOUGHT 
Given that the whole point of the doctrine of divine accommodation was to 
explain and justify the existence of human variety, it was only natural that the 
theorists and theologians who undertook to draw the implications of this doctrine 
for human conduct and knowledge exhibited a similar diversity in their opinions 
about the proper way to interpret that doctrine and its implications. As we have 
seen, the doctrine was applied to a great variety of domains and subject areas, 
including biblical exegesis (where a veritable “exegetical revolution” in the 
thirteenth century61 ultimately led to the radical practices of modern biblical 
criticism); religious polemics (where Christians squared off against Jews and 
various sects of Christians faced off against one another, culminating in the great 
squaring off of Protestantism against the Catholic Church and continuing into 
later religious controversies);62 the “New Science,”63 which included history and 
the analysis of different human cultures alongside the natural sciences; and the 
subject here—politics and law. There was no single theory of politics and law 
derived from the theological principle of divine accommodation. The political 
theories developed out of that principle were multifarious—fittingly so, since the 
foundational premise of the principle was that human beings differed in their 
beliefs, perceptions, and ways of understanding the world and interpreting the 
divine will. 
Common to all of these intellectual endeavors, however, was a dawning 
recognition of the fact that circumstances and, more particularly, human societies 
evolve and change over time, and that human beings’ beliefs are never free of the 
imprint of their historical context. Along with that came growing recognition and, 
more importantly, acceptance of the relative autonomy of the natural world, 
 
60. From this standpoint, it is precisely because we are perpetually in an impure state 
(“perpetually” meaning for so long as we occupy the sublunar material and temporal realm) that the 
problem of accommodating different groups with different beliefs persists, with every proposed 
solution replicating the problem it was designed to solve. This is the paradox of pluralism made 
familiar by generations of critics of liberalism from both the left and the right. That problem can be 
recast as the animating principle of theory of divine accommodation, the central paradox around 
which all accommodationist political theories are formed. 
61. FUNKENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 218–19. 
62. See Stolzenberg, supra note 16. 
63. FUNKENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 213. 
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including human history. As Funkenstein explicates, the notion of divine 
accommodation gave rise to a “strong sense of the absolute autonomy and 
spontaneity of human history.”64 Although this historicist sensibility was modern, 
it was born of the traditional (classical) insistence on the importance of context and 
reconstructing the intentions of the author to determining the meaning of a text. 
Rhetoric’s insistence on contextualizing intent was built into the principle of 
accommodation, and that propelled the development of a humanist conception of 
the autonomy of human action. More and more, the view took hold that human 
action was not (or not wholly) determined by God and was therefore explainable 
in terms of science and natural forces—and that this itself was part of God’s plan. 
Although such theories appeared to diminish the role of God, while 
simultaneously granting more and more autonomy and authority to the forces of 
physical nature, history, and human psychology, they grew out of sincere attempts 
to understand and reconcile the divine attributes of God. Thus, Funkenstein 
relates how a sense of the autonomy of human history originated in the attempt to 
explain such ancient practices as idolatry and animal sacrifice, abominations 
seemingly sanctioned in the Bible, but (according to the religious thinking of the 
day) actually constituting a grotesque violation of God’s law. Being all-powerful, 
God could have caused the false beliefs of the primitive cultures in which He first 
revealed Himself to be replaced with the right doctrine of monotheism overnight. 
Instead, He chose to have human beings come to an ever fuller understanding of 
monotheism gradually, through a process of internal mental growth, facilitated by 
His adaptation (accommodation) to their existing beliefs and practices. This, 
according to the “secular theologians” described by Funkenstein, was God’s 
“cunning”—to allow for the autonomy of human action and the development of 
human knowledge in order to bring about a gradual fulfillment of His (hidden) 
divine plan.65 Why He did so surpassed human understanding; that He did so 
followed logically from the premises that God is all-powerful, all-knowing and 
good. 
This basic idea that God has made space not just for human variety but for 
human autonomy propelled the development of many different areas of human 
inquiry. All of the natural sciences and the social sciences, in particular the modern 
fields of history, social thought, and economic thought, are traced by Funkenstein 
to the evolution of accommodationist thought. In perhaps his most fascinating 
chapter, on “Divine Providence and the Course of History,” Funkenstein traces 
the dawning of modern historicism to the metamorphosis of divine providence 
and divine “cunning” into the “invisible hand” of history.66 Most important for 
 
64. Id. at 204. 
65. Id. at 234–39; see EDEN, supra note 16; cf. Benin, supra note 16 (providing a historiography 
of divine accommodation and characterizing it as the “cunning of God”). 
66. FUNKENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 201 (“A respectable family of explanations in social and 
economic thought since the seventeenth century is sometimes known by the name ‘invisible-hand’ 
explanations, a term borrowed from Adam Smith. In many variations, we are taught how ‘private 
vices’ turn, of themselves, into ‘publick virtues’; how the individual pursuit of self-interest contributes 
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our purposes is the “legal science” that lay at the core of this historicist 
revolution.67 Vico, whose work promoted the historicist revolution, was “an heir,” 
Funkenstein tell us, “to the humanistic interpretation of Roman law,”68 as well as 
to the tradition of humanistic philology that developed out of the application of 
the ancient traditions of textual criticism first to biblical and then to an ever-
widening category of social texts. “It was a reaction,” Funkenstein explains, 
against the elevation of the Corpus iuris civilis to the status of a universal, 
inexhaustible paradigm of legal wisdom, as if it were an ideal law valid for 
all times. . . . The tedious dispute between the adherents of the Loi écrit 
and the adherents of the coutumes generated the insight that there could 
never be an ideal law valid for all times.69 
 
ipso facto to the common wealth and welfare. Spinoza based his political theory on this mechanism; 
Mandeville popularized it . . . . Likewise since the seventeenth century, versions of the invisible-hand 
explanation were employed to illuminate the course of history, the evolution of society. . . . Vico 
named this process ‘providence’ and stressed time and again the oblique nature of its operation—
unintended by individuals and unknown to them.”). Funkenstein goes on to show how  
[t]he many versions of reason in history from Vico to Marx are only speculative 
byproducts of a profound revolution in historical thought in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, namely the discovery of history as contextual reasoning. A new concept of historical 
facts, and of the meaning of historical facts, emerged in the seventeenth century; a 
conception of every historical fact, be it a text, an institution, a monument, or an event, as 
meaningless in itself unless seen in its original context. 
Id. at 206. This, in turn, was less an innovation than a reconstruction of the ancient principle of 
accommodation. Funkenstein: 
Again we wonder: how radical was this break, what precisely was new in this “New 
Science?” Evidently, the ways of seeking signs for the divine providence working in history 
have changed; but “harmony,” “correspondence,” “concordance” within historical 
periods—[the various terms coined by the early theorists of modern history such as Vico 
and Montesquieu to capture such ideas as “the spirit of the time”]—were . . . not 
altogether alien to medieval historical reflection; we encounter them, in particular, in 
medieval notions of divine accommodation. 
Id. at 213. To take just one exemplar, “Vico’s key terms . . . are ‘harmony,’ ‘convenience,’ 
‘correspondence,’ or ‘accommodation,’” terms used to encapsulate the idea that “[a]ll human affairs . . 
. of a society at a given phase correspond to and reflect each other; they form a harmonious whole 
and are shaped by the very same ‘mode of the time.’” Id. at 209 (footnote omitted). “Not all of this 
was Vico’s discovery. . . . Vico was an heir to generations of humanistic scholarship since the 
sixteenth century. Sixteenth-century philologists returned to the level once achieved by the ancients 
and surpassed it.” Id. at 210. And again: “[H]umanistic philology surpassed its ancient paradigms; and 
it did so by moving from textual criticism and textual exegesis to the reconstruction of history.” Id. at 
211. The metamorphosis of this theological notion of divine cunning and “providence” into the 
“invisible hand” of history is thoroughly discussed by Funkenstein. Id. at 202–13. 
67. Although American legal scholars commonly associate the idea of law as a legal science 
with the pedagogic innovations that Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced to Harvard Law 
School in the 1870s, the idea of legal science goes back much earlier to thinkers such as Vico and 
Montesquieu, who first applied modern historical methods to the study of law, exploring the variety 
of legal systems and their relativity to different cultures. On the history of the notion of legal science, 
see M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 95 
(1986). 
68. FUNKENSTEIN, supra note 15, at 211. 
69. Id. 
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Thus, Vico simultaneously historicized law and placed law at the center of the 
study of society, using the tools of textual criticism that derived from the ancient 
tradition of rhetoric, foremost among them, the principle of accommodation. 
 The question of the nature of law was central to a more general inquiry into 
the question of what mode of human government was demanded by the principle 
of divine accommodation. The effort to understand what the doctrine of divine 
accommodation required or permitted in the domain of human legal and political 
institutions yielded many different theories and many different models of 
sovereignty. What these various political theories (or political theologies) had in 
common was that they all offered ways of responding to the diversity of human 
societies, religions, and cultures. The same awareness of cultural, religious, and 
legal pluralism that propelled the development of the new historical science 
exemplified by Vico also motivated the articulation of different schools of social 
and economic thought and, most importantly, political thought. All of these 
theories struggled to come to terms with human pluralism and variety, not just 
with the evident fact that human societies were encased in different cultures with 
different beliefs (an empirical situation that was increasingly undeniable, but in 
principle, eradicable), but also, more fundamentally, with the belief that such 
diversity was not just acceptable to God, but was indeed part of the divine plan. 
That said, it was far from obvious that human government was supposed to 
emulate God’s embrace and accommodation of human differences. It did not 
follow automatically from the principle that God accommodated Himself to 
human variety and diverse beliefs that human societies were supposed to do so. 
The version of the imago dei, which held that people and governments should 
tolerate diversity because God tolerates diversity, was but one of several logical 
paths that could be followed out of the core idea of divine accommodation. Quite 
the opposite conclusion—that governments must not tolerate false beliefs—could 
be drawn from the principle of divine accommodation. Indeed, divine 
accommodation was such a malleable principle that it was consistent with all 
manner of political theories and models of government, from the relatively 
tolerant to the most illiberal. 
Many political philosophers working in this tradition drew the intermediary 
conclusion that the religious and cultural differences that existed between societies 
represented the arrangement that God had chosen to accommodate different 
peoples with different beliefs. On this view, it was neither necessary nor right to 
accommodate differences within a single political system; on the contrary, each 
people was supposed to have its own government and law. On the more liberal 
end of the spectrum, there were accommodationist theorists who drew the 
conclusion that God intended for different beliefs (and different religions and 
conceptions of law) to be tolerated and accommodated within a sovereign state or 
single legal regime. And, at the opposite end of the spectrum, there were those 
who argued that the principle of divine accommodation demanded the 
establishment of a single monolithic universal system of belief and law. The idea 
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that such a system of government was commanded by a God who Himself 
tolerated religious differences may seem counterintuitive, but it followed logically 
from the idea that God only tolerated (accommodate) false beliefs temporarily in 
order to better facilitate the transition to the one true faith. Applying this view of 
divine “cunning” (the forerunner of the historical dialectic), which was commonly 
twinned the principle of divine accommodation, it was not difficult for Christian 
theologians to justify human institutions which blended religious and political 
authority (like the Inquisition or the Holy Roman Empire) as human agents of the 
divine tutelage under which human beings would shed their false primitive beliefs 
and progress toward the one, true way. These illiberal political theories followed 
from the teleological understanding of accommodation, according to which God’s 
acceptance of different beliefs was an accommodation to human cognitive 
limitations and moral deficiencies that would, through God’s cunning, 
progressively be overcome. 
Accommodationist political theories thus ran the gamut from versions of 
legal pluralism (which prescribed religious and cultural pluralism among different 
political units, but not within each one) to anti-pluralist theories of Christian 
empire, with more liberal theories of cultural pluralism and tolerance of diversity 
within a single state in between. None of these radically different models of 
government and managing human diversity would be ruled out by reasoning from 
the principle of divine accommodation and indeed each and every one of these 
was at one point or another advanced and justified on the basis of that same 
principle. 
But every political theory spun out of the principle of accommodation had to 
offer some kind of answer to the question of how human beings, and human 
governments, should relate to human diversity, given the premise, which lay at the 
foundation of all accommodationist theories, that God Himself accepted and 
accommodated Himself to human differences. Notwithstanding the fact that 
accommodationist thought produced justifications for the most illiberal forms of 
government as well as liberal policies of tolerance for diversity, it was always hard 
to reconcile the more imperialist elements of accommodationist theory with the 
abiding belief in divine accommodation to imperfect beliefs. With this same 
heritage came the companion idea that “it is the task of the judge as the living 
interpreter of the lawmaker’s intentions to accommodate the infinite variety and 
variability of human circumstances to a fixed and generalized set of rules,” a belief 
that was rooted in the classical Aristotelian conception of equity with which the 
principle of accommodation has always been twinned.70 That ancient idea of 
accommodation as equitable judgment would be carried like a germ into every 
political theory derived from the theological doctrine of divine accommodation. 
And no matter how illiberal or intolerant a given accommodationist political 
regime or political theory was, that ancient kernel of thought would persist, 
 
70. EDEN, supra note 16, at 102.  
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goading others to develop better ways of realizing the foundational idea that 
human diversity was part of God’s plan. In this way, even when it served to justify 
illiberal political arrangements, the tradition of political thought rooted in the 
doctrine of divine accommodation incubated ever more liberal principles of 
religious tolerance, pluralism, accommodation, and freedom of belief. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has made these basic assertions: first, that liberalism derives 
from the principle of divine accommodation; second, that the political logic 
derived from that principle was an emergency theory; and third, that the political 
theory of the liberal secular state is a political theology, bearing all of the hallmarks 
of political theology, to wit, an emergency theory of the state, a belief in the 
permanence of the state of emergency, and the derivation of these beliefs from 
theological principles. The secular state and the rule of law, on this account, were 
both conceived as necessary responses to the state of emergency that is produced 
by the inability of human beings to follow divine law. Such a theory brought 
liberal and illiberal, secular and religious elements together in a potent and 
unstable mix that lent itself to a variety of interpretations and reinterpretations, all 
of which were propelled by the effort to come to terms with the diversity of 
human beliefs, and which in turn propelled the development of liberal political 
theory. 
I have offered this historical reconstruction of the genealogy of an idea not 
for its own sake, but because I believe it sheds light on contemporary liberalism. 
Beyond the insight it gives us into the contemporary practice and principle of 
accommodating religious beliefs, reconstructing the historical career of the 
concept of accommodation illuminates broader issues as well, including the 
modern state’s secular nature, its liberal nature, the relationship between its secular 
and liberal natures, the nature of liberalism, and the conditions that at once 
necessitate and confound religious and legal pluralism. Recovering the logic of the 
theological argument for accommodation and seeing how that logic leads to an 
emergency theory of the state helps us to better understand Robert Cover’s 
dictum that liberal virtues are “imperial” as opposed to “paideic.”71 It thus helps 
us to gain deeper insight into the links between liberalism and conservatism, 
pluralism and empire, states of exception and states of law. At the same time, 
along with the larger edifice of secularist theology of which the doctrine of 
accommodation is a part, it provides us with a new (or rather, old but long-
forgotten) perspective on the relationship between religion and the state and the 
very meaning of secular government and law. 
I have engaged in this reconstruction of the deep theological roots of 
modern (secular) political theory not for the sake of producing a more faithful 
historical account (either of the liberal political tradition or of the intellectual 
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tradition of political theology), but rather, for the sake of attaining a better 
understanding of liberalism and its inherent relationship to the state of emergency, 
the exception, and to theological thought—in short, to all of the essential 
components of political theology. Both liberalism’s relationship to political 
conservatism and its relationship to religion have been badly misconstrued. We 
may come to understand liberalism and its paradoxes better if we see how the 
fundamentally liberal doctrine of accommodation and the quintessentially 
conservative political theological doctrine of the state of emergency (or state of 
exception) have always been interrelated, if not one and the same.72 
To those who are skeptical of the reconciliation between political theology 
and liberal secularism proposed here and who remain committed to the reigning 
belief that political theology is unequivocally antiliberal and antisecular, I want to 
say: at least consider the possibility that the doctrine of divine accommodation is 
part of the canon of political-theological thought. If so, then what are the 
implications for political and legal theory? What are the implications for liberalism, 
for political theology, and for the relationship between them? Perhaps the 
proposition that the theological doctrine of accommodation belongs in the canon 
of political theological thought can be refuted. If so, I would like to understand 
what the basis for that refutation is. But if it cannot be refuted, then I hope that 
others will join me in trying to think through the implications of that doctrine’s 
dual role in generating both the emergency theory of law and politics and the 
theory of liberalism that dominates our political thinking and political practices 
today. 
 
72. In a similarly irenic spirit, others have proposed interpretations of political theology that 
incorporate the ethics of the neighbor. See KENNETH REINHARD, Toward a Political Theology of the 
Neighbor, in THE NEIGHBOR: THREE INQUIRIES IN POLITICAL THEOLOGY 11, 11–75 (2006). 
